Pirates, Part IV

Will someone with better video editing skills than me please put together a Pirates of the Caribbean/Somali Pirates mash-up? Sure, it's a bit of a high-brow reference, but I think it has potential. In the meantime, here's your weekly mash-up:

Pride of place? I think not...

Strange Maps has found a striking correlation between counties in the South that voted for Obama (almost uniformly African-American) and the centers for cotton production in 1860.

What does all of this mean? I need to think about it some more.

Why the U.S. is Afraid to Crack Down on Somali Pirates

By now I'm sure many of you are aware that Harardheere is the 21st-century Tortuga. Piracy in Somalia has been on the upswing since the ousting of the Barre regime in 1991, but it was the 2006 civil war and invasion by Ethiopia that has made the Gulf of Aden the most dangerous waterway in the world. When Somalis originally began attacking boats off the coast of their country in the 1990s it was to prevent longliners from fishing illegally in Somali waters, which are rich in skipjack and other types of tuna. Although Taiwanese and Sri Lankan fisherman continue to poach off the Somali coast, it is little justification for the current activities of the Somali pirates, who are targeting oil tankers and other prime vessels for ransom. While many Somalis are suffering since the threat of piracy has scared off shipments of food and other essential goods to the area, al-Qaeda is having trouble gaining an ideological foothold in the region. The U.S. could not be happier about that.

Although it hasn't received much mention, the U.S. secretly backed Somali warlords against the Islamic Courts Union both during and after the civil war in 2006 (as an aside, since many of these warlords sell phony licenses to poachers, the U.S. has indirectly supported the pirates' fallacious explanation for their actions). The U.S. was rightfully fearful that the imposition of sharia law and consolidation of power under an Islamic government would be deleterious to the war on terror, not that their fears have been abated by the Transitional Federal Government, which wields little power compared to the regional authorities. Somalia is a destabilized country with significant Muslim influence. Combined with its proximity to the Middle East, Somalia is fertile ground for the dissemination of al-Qaeda's ideology and the recruitment of future terrorists. Al-Qaeda, however, has had difficulty gaining momentum in Somalia. The reason: money often trumps ideology, especially for those who have lived in abject poverty for so long. The amount of cash flowing into Somalia as a result of piracy is considerable, and nothing soothes disgruntled youths like full stomachs and a pair of Nikes. While many in Somalia still go hungry, the local rulers and their lackeys (the ones al-Qaeda needs to ingratiate themselves with in order to have success) are too flush with cash to care about providing Muslim extremists a pulpit.

Clearly something has to be done about piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Pirates are moving south towards the Seychelles, threatening the delivery of goods to Kenya and Tanzania. The U.S., however, cannot be part of the solution on that front. Our ties to Somali warlords and our need to stamp out al-Qaeda will cloud our judgments. Considering the failure of U.S., French, and NATO forces to combat piracy in this area, I think it is time for South Africa to make considerable efforts to protect its neighbors along the east coast of Africa. They are the only country in the region with a functioning navy, and have every incentive to end piracy along the horn of Africa. Meanwhile, our President-elect can elicit a great deal of social change in the region, especially given its proximity to his provenance. While Somalia, lacking in natural resources and industry development, will likely always be a very poor country fraught with difficulties, the United States can commit to working in concert with the African Union to promote basic human rights and a minimum level of existence for the population. The heart of al-Qaeda beats in Waziristan, not Mogadishu. Until that changes, the U.S. needs to prioritize its security concerns.

There is No Such Thing as a Free Trade (Yet)

During the (reportedly) conciliatory meeting between President George W. Bush and President-elect Barack Obama this past Monday at the White House, Bush hinted that he would be amenable to Obama's call for federal assistance to the auto industry if Obama drops his opposition to the Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CoFTA). The response of hyper-partisan liberals to Bush's non-germane quid pro quo predictably skewered the President for his willingness to support a measure meant to preserve American jobs so long as the President-elect does not interfere with legislation that its opponents believe will add further strain to our domestic workforce. I am confounded by the many conflicting analyses of the impact of CoFTA's antecedents -- NAFTA and CAFTA -- on American jobs; perhaps statistician wunderkind Nate Silver can figure out who's telling the truth. What is clearer to me is that Bush believes the following:

1. Colombian president Álvaro Uribe, a U.S. ally in an area of the world moving precariously to the left, deserves recompense for his allegiance to America as well as his efforts to curb both the drug trade and the violence against union leaders



2. Countries rich in natural resources remain relatively stable during periods of economic turbulence
   


3. Despite the ongoing degradation of the U.S. financial markets, supply-side theory remains the best policy for economic development in both developed and developing nations

Until this year, #1 had become difficult to argue against. Although he has only sparred with Hugo Chávez and his compatriates on rare occasion, Uribe has stood firm against the Marxist-Leninist governments and ideologies that pepper the continent. Since assuming the presidency in 2002, Uribe has brought a modicum of order to a country besieged by guerrilla warfare, paralyzed by ineffective public institutions, and degraded by decades of the illegal drug trade. In 2008, however, Uribe's country has slipped from his grasp as the rate of union leader murders is rising and his own military has engaged in egregious violations of human rights in order to inflate its success rates against FARC and ELN rebels. Such actions are even more tragic because Colombia's military only functions as a result of direct aid from the U.S.. Furthermore, while the opium/heroin trade has declined this decade, coca cultivation has increased 15% from 2000-2006, and cocaine production has risen by 4%.

#2 is a risky belief to hold, particularly during these uncertain times. U.S.-based multinational companies are eager to transfer some operations to a country so abundant in both natural resources and cheap labor. Even in more stable economic environments, such relocations are fraught with calamity (Nigeria comes to mind). With some commodity prices in freefall while others spike, will the "resource curse" lead to the collapse of Colombia's economy and/or government?

Despite so much evidence to the contrary, Bush still believes in the fundamentals of trickle-down economics. How else can he support a free trade policy that may cost American jobs, but will certainly increase the bottom line for American companies? How else can he believe free trade will improve the living standards of Colombia's working class unless he trusts the country's wealthy elite to better working conditions for the masses? #3 is the panacea argument for CoFTA: if Uribe no longer "deserves" CoFTA, he "needs" it in order to keep Colombia from spiraling out of control. If Colombia is rocked by political instability and civil unrest in the face of fluctuating commodity prices, CoFTA is essential in order to restructure corporate activity and the workforce. In the end, Bush's support for CoFTA is not rooted in his intent to line the pockets of the corporate elite, but it is a consequence of his continuing adherence to Reaganomics.

This is not to say I am against free trade with Colombia. I hold fast to the ideals of fair trade, but recognize that the implications of price distortion are serious and far-reaching. I am also aware that agribusiness will be instrumental not just in the survival of the global economy, but in the survival of our species. Unfortunately, the CoFTA legislation as it is currently penned is far too dangerous for me to support. Without the appropriate safeguards in place, the inevitable "race to the bottom" among corporate interests in Colombia will go unchecked. Excessive monocropping and a dearth of environmental and quality-control standards will threaten Colombia's long-term agricultural opportunities, devastate the ecology of the upper Amazon basin, and endanger the health of the American public. Although recent amendments to CoFTA have made some inroads on these fronts, foreign investor rights provisions in the legislation prevent the U.S. from forcing multi-national corporations to adhere to minimum standards of agricultural preservation and product safety in Colombia. These provisions also prevent the U.S. from requiring many minimum standards for Colombian workers.

Foreign investor rights are the main reason I oppose NAFTA and CAFTA. U.S. taxpayers have been forced to pay millions of dollars to multi-national corporations who have sued the U.S. successfully in order to lift bans on toxic substances, farming methods, and labor requirements. CoFTA is even more alarming, since it extends these foreign investor rights to oil, logging, and mining interests. If CoFTA is enacted in its current form, the financial windfall for these stakeholders will likely be massive. While the standard of living for the poorest Colombians may improve slightly under CoFTA (absent short-term political and social upheaval), the distribution of wealth in the country will become even more pronounced at the expense of long-term stability and success. It is imperative that any free trade agreement with Colombia (i) benefit all of the country's citizens sufficiently to provide opportunities for social and financial advancement; (ii) protect Colombia's environment; and (iii) ensure the safety of Colombia's exports.